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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
14211

-vsBILLY WAYNE BLACK,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of murder in
the second degree.

The case was tried before a jury, the

Honorable Judge J. Robert Bullock, presiding*
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was charged with the crime of murder
in the second degree, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-50-1 (1953), as amended, a jury returned a verdict of
guilty and a sentence of from five years to life imprisonment was imposed.
conviction.

Appellant now appeals from that

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of
the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning of August 19, 1972, a
twenty-five year old woman was shot and killed.

Barbara

Ann Owens was a waitress at a cocktail lounge in Orem,
Utah.

She lived at Alpine Villa Hotel with Billy Jo

Robinson, a/k/a Black, appellant in this case.

Apparently

the two had only recently arrived in the Provo-Orem area.
On the night of August 18, 1972, Barbara Owens
worked the late shift at the lounge.

She was seen leaving

with Billy Jo Robinson at approximately Is 00 afint

Billy

Jo had spent that evening at the lounge playing pool.

Earlier

in the evening Miss Owens spent time dancing with another
male patron.

This incident was the source of a heated

argument between Ms. Owens and the appellant after they
left the lounge.
a.m.

They arrived at their room, about 1:15

A neighbor overheard angry quarreling concerning the

incident at the lounge.
threats by the man to
fire.

He heard slapping, hitting, crying,

8,

kill you both," and eventually, gun

Barbara was shot in the head with a .22 caliber pistol.
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Appellant put her in her car and drove her to the hospital,
where she was pronounced dead on arrival.

Two policemen

followed appellant to the hospital, as he was driving in
excess of the speed limit.

After Miss Owens was pronounced

dead, appellant was placed in custody for questioning.

At

an opportune moment, however, he slipped out of the hospital
and fled the state.
Appellant testified at trial that there had been
an argument but that the shooting was accidental.

He

claimed that while he was packing his gun, it discharged,
hitting and killing Miss Owens.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
Appellant claims that the court erred in denying
his motion for acquittal based on lack of evidence.

The

record, however, provides sufficient evidence to support
the conviction and the denial of appellantfs motion.
Appellant was convicted of second degree murder.
This is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought.

It does not require premeditation.
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The evidence in this case is, for the most part,
circumstantial.

There were no eye-witnesses, etc.

But

the evidence is, nonetheless, sufficient to support a
guilty verdict.

It is the jury's province to weigh the

evidence and draw reasonable inference therefrom.

A

review of the record shows that one could indeed reasonably conclude appellant's guilt from the evidence and
testimony presented at trial.

Mrs. Merrot, Miss Owens1

employer, testified that before leaving the lounge on the
morning of her death, Barbara asked if she could come to
work the next night with a black eye (Tr.29).

She gave

no further explanation, but apparently suspected trouble
with her boyfriend, Billy Jo, over the dancing incident
(Tr.30).

Barbara then left the lounge in the company of

Billy (Tr.28,38).

They arrived at their apartment

(hotel) at approximately 1:15 a.m. (Tr.122).
ensued

(Tr.122).

A quarrel

Mr. Johansen, a man occupying the

room next door, was awakened by the fight.

He heard

yelling and screaming between a woman and a man named
Billy (Tr.122).

They were arguing over the woman dancing

with another man (Tr.122).

There was considerable hitting

and slapping during the quarrel (Tr.122).
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The woman,

pleaded with Billy to stop (Tr.122).

At one point in

the fight he threatened to "kill you both." (Tr.122).
He then announced that he was leaving and ordered the
woman to pack his things (Tr.122).. Mr. Johansen then heard
a gun shot (Tr.123).

The shot was followed by the shuffle

of feet (Tr.123) and the opening and closing of a car door
(Tr.123).

Mr. Johansen looked out the window and observed

a car pull out and drive away (Tr.123).
Appellant also testified that there was an
argument.

He admitted that there was slapping but avowed

that there was no "hitting" with fists or other objects
(Tr.160).

He also testified that at one point during the

fight he ripped Miss Owens1 brassiere off (Tr.159).
Dr. Rich, deputy medical examiner for the State
Department of Health, gave testimony contradicting appellant's statements.

He testified that an extensive, external

examination of the deceased's body revealed numerous bruises
over her back, chest, breasts,arms and shoulders (Tr.46).
He testified that these bruises were recent, less than 72
hours old (Tr.47), probably within 24 hours (Tr.48).

There

was also a distinct mark on her back, a little over two
inches long (Tr.48).
Rich testified:

As to the cause of the mark, Dr.

"My immediate opinion, that
perhaps some sort of belt . . .
some sort of western belt with some
kind of rivet . . . with some sort
of protruding decoration*" (Tr.48)
Mrs. Merrot testified that appellant was wearing such a
belt buckle the night of the killing (Tr.159).

Appellant

testified that it was probably the brassiere strap that
occasioned the mark on Barbara's back (Tr.159).
was asked if this was a plausible explanation.

Dr. Rich
He stated

that he did not believe the bra could cause such markings:
"I've not seen this particular pattern caused by a brassiere."
(Tr.53).

From the testimony of Dr. Rich it is clear that

Miss Owens was severely beaten, apparently not only by
someone's hands, but with a belt.

The argument between

appellant and the deceased was not a minor confrontation
as

appellant's testimony suggests.

The evidence supports

a violent, physical fight where direct threats were made
(Tr.122).
When questioned by police at the hospital,
appellant gave two different accounts of what had taken
place that night (Tr.83).

But he never once mentioned

that it was an accident or offered any explanation similar
to that which he gave in court. Nor was he willing to
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answer further questions at that time.

Instead, at

the first opportune moment, he slipped out of the
hospital and fled the state (Tr.163).
Also, a part of the record is testimony
establishing appellantfs experience and familiarity
with firearms (Tr.161).

He carried a .45 for three

years in Vietnam (Tr.161).

From this evidence the

jury could have reasonably believed that a man so
knowledgeable about guns would not have picked up a
loaded gun that was cocked (Tr.161) without first
taking appropriate precautions.
Also in the record is appellant's own
testimony that when he fled he took the gun with him
and later disposed of it (Tr.177).

This evidence too

could reasonably infer guilt or fear of detection on
the part of appellant.
The evidence thus presented is sufficient
to sustain the jury's verdict and the court's ruling
on appellant's motion.

If there is any evidence

supporting the verdict it must be upheld.

Wyatt v.

Baughman, 121 Utah 98, 239 P.2d 193 (1951)•

The

evidence in this case meets that requirement.
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The

jury was present to hear the testimony and view the
evidence.

Their verdict shows that they believed

the testimony by Mr. Johansen, Dr. Rich, and others
who testified of a violent argument, physical
attack, and calculated threats, which ultimately
led to an intentional shooting resulting in the
death of Barbara Ann Owens•

It is obvious that

they did not accept the explanation offered by
appellant.

This is their legal prerogative.

The evidence is sufficient to support a
conviction of murder in the second degree and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying appellantfs
motion to acquit.
POINT II
REMARKS MADE BY THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT WERE NOT IMPROPER NOR
PREJUDICIAL.
Appellant argues that certain statements
made by the prosecuting attorney in his closing
argument were improper, prejudicial and grounds for
reversal.
The statements in question concern State's
Exhibit No. 19.

This exhibit is a ripped piece of
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paisely material, presumably a dress or skirt. It was
found in a paper sack in the hotel room of the deceased,
and was admitted into evidence after proper identification
by the investigating officer, Officer Ferre.

Also found

in the sack and admitted into evidence was a torn
brassiere (Exhibit No. 18).
The prosecuting attorney referred to Exhibit
No. 19 twice during his closing statement to the jury.
On page 189 of the transcript, Mr. Wootton stated:
"I've got a torn dress,
I've got a torn bra, I've got a
picture of her, and I've got her
driver's license."
The second reference is found on page 193:
"He had beat her for almost an
hour, apparently very violently.
All you've got to do is look at the
marks and look at the torn dress,
which he didn't mention incidentally,
According to him she took it off
herself."
These two passages are the only mention of the dress (or
skirt) in Mr. Wootton's closing remarks.
Appellant claims that the "prosecutor was
arguing that which was not in evidence. . . . " (refer
to appellant's brief, page 22). This is obviously not the
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case.

The "skirt" was admitted into evidence by the

court, after proper identification by Officer Ferre.
Therefore, references to that article of clothing
pertained to that which was clearly in evidence, and
were therefore proper references.
Appellant also contends that the prosecuting
attorneyfs arguments "were in no way a good faith
interpretation of the evidence.1'

(Refer to appellant's

brief, page 22.)
Counsels have great latitude in their closing
statements.

They may properly interpret and draw any

reasonable inferences from the evidence.

A summation

of proper attorney conduct in this area is found in
C.JeS. Vol. 88, § 181:
"Counsel may state and comment
on all proper inferences from the
evidence. . . Counsel is allowed
latitude in drawing and arguing
inferences from the evidence, he
may draw conclusions from the evidence
on his own system of reasoning,
although such inferences as stated
by counsel are inconclusive, improbable,
illogical, erroneous, or even absurd,
unless such conclusions are couched
in language transcending the bounds
of legitimate argument. Counsel may
draw an inference from the evidence
although the inference is contrary to
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other evidence. However, it is
improper for counsel to draw
inferences where there are no
grounds for them in the evidence,
or to indulge in denunciations
based on assumed facts."
C.J.S. Vol. 88, § 182 states:
"Counsel may discuss and
comment on the evidence in his
argument to the jury. . . Counsel
should not be subjected to unreasonable restraint in commenting
on the evidence, but should be
allowed a wide latitude, and the scope of permissible argument is
a matter for the sound discretion
of the trial judge. . . While
counsel may properly refer to a
comment on, evidence adduced by the
other party, he is not obliged to
point out evidence which favors
his opponent, and so may disregard
any such evidence of an explanatory
character. . . . "
The two brief references made by the prosecuting attorney
were made in good faith and were proper, reasonable
inferences, drawn from the evidence.

The dress was

clearly in evidence, and a quick examination of the
clothing reveals that it is indeed "torn."

Mr. Johansen

testified that during the argument, "Billy" ordered the
woman to "take it off." (Tr.123).

One could reasonably

conclude that the dress was torn during their quarrel.
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If Mr. Wootton!s comments were improper, as
appellant claims, the remarks were not prejudicial
and would not therefore be grounds for reversal.
C.J.S. 88 § 182 states:
11

[A] misstatement of the
evidence will not be fatal error
with respect to a matter of
trifling or of no importance, and
a mere misrecollection or accidental
misstatement of evidence in argument
does not render the trial unfair
as a matter of law."
The torn dress was evidence, at most, of a violent
argument.

Other evidence supported this theory—the

torn bra, the bruises on the deceased's body, and the
testimony of Mr. Johansen.

The reference to the dress

as "torn," and any inferences drawn from that statement
were only cumulative or corroborative evidence and
cannot have prejudiced appellant in any way.
Nothing the prosecuting attorney said was
calculated to inflame the jury or prejudice appellant.
The prosecuting attorney advised the jury:
"Now I want to caution you as
I comment on the evidence that the
things that I'm about to say concerning
the evidence are not to be considered
by you as evidence."
The prosecuting attorney's statements were good faith
interpretations of the evidence and as such were proper.
No prejudice has resulted to appellant.

POINT III
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL TRIAL DUE TO JUROR FAMILIARITY
WITH PROSECUTING WITNESS.
Appellant claims that he was denied a fair trial
before an impartial jury.

He bases this claim

on

the familiarity of two jurors with two witnesses.
After the trial began appellant discovered
that juror Holman was acquainted with Officer Ferre,
the complaining witness in this case.

They had at

one time lived across the street from one another.
Mr. Holman,however, moved from Orem, and out of the
State in 1957, almost twenty years ago.

Since that

time there has been little or no contact between
them.

Mr. Holman testified

(Tr. 224) :

"I don't believe we!ve spoken
three words to one another since
that time."
He also testified that there were no close relationships
between the families, only casual acquaintances far. 224).
The degree of familiarization existing between
Mr. Holman and Officer Ferre did not deprive appellant
of a fair trial as a matter of law.

Their relationship

was not grounds for disqualification.
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(See Utah Code

Ann. i 77-30-19 (1953), as amended.

The existence

of such a relationship, esentially defunct for close
to twenty years, would be at best, grounds for
exercising a preemptory challenge.

The relationship

is too extenuated in time, intensity and degree
to infer bias, as a matter of law.

Refer to

Utah Code Ann. §77-30-19 (1953) as, amended.

As a

matter of fact, Mr. Holman testified that he
was not influenced by this casual acquaintance but
based his verdict solely upon the evidence presented
in court

(Tr«225). The trial court did not err

in denying appellantfs motion for mistrial based on
the above familiarity.

It was a matter within the

sound discretion of the court and appellant has
shown no abuse of that discretion.
The second juror-witness relationship complained
of is that of Officer Bullock and juror Laursen.
During a recess in the trial, appellant observed a
conversation between the two men.

The conversation

was short - the passing of amenities*

Mr. Laursen

and OfficerBullock1s father had once worked at the
same factory.

Mr. Laursen and Officer Bullock were

not acquainted personally
even spoken to one another
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(Tr.222).
(Tr.223).

They had never
Mr. Laursen

inquired about the health of Officer Bullock's father.
Officer Bullock responded to that question.
This was the extent of their conversation.
An extensive discussion of juror communication with
witnesses in a criminal trial, is found in 9 A.L.R.
3d

1275.

It is generally agreed that unauthorized

conversation between a juror and a witness is improper.
(See State v. Crank, 105 U. 332, 142 P.2dl78 (1943).)
Most Courts take the view that unless there is an
actual showing of prejudice resulting from the
communication, the conviction should be affirmed not~
withstanding the impropriety,

(See State v. Mangrum,

98 Ariz. 279, 403p.2d925 (1965); People v. Aquirref
158 Cal. App. 2d 304, 322 p. 2d 478 (1958).) Where the
conversation is affirmatively shown to have been
unrelated to defendant's case, the cases are nearly
unanimous that reversal is not required, especially
where there is only a passing of civilities or similiar
casual conversation.

(See Steiner v. United States,

229F.-2d745, (Ca. 9, 1956); Miles v. State, 268 P.2d
290 (1954); People v. Murphy, 107 N.E.2d 748, 412 ill.
458, (1952); and State v. Johnson, 97 Ariz. 27,.
396p.2d392 (1964).)
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The conversation between Mr. Laursen and
Officer Bullock was unauthorized and improper.

It

is not grounds for a mistrial nor grounds for reversal.
The conversation was unrelated to the case and
amounted to a mere passing of civilities.

The appellant

was not therefore prejudiced thereby.
There is nothing in the record to indicate
that either juror was influenced by his contact or
passing acquaintance with a witness.

On the

contrary, the testimony of the jurors themselves
affirmatively shows that their verdicts had nothing
whatsoever to do with any familiarity with Officer
Ferre and Officer Bullock.

They based their

verdicts solely upon the evidence presented in
court.
The trial court gave both attorneys ample
opportunity to question the jurors.

It did not deter

defense counsel "from exploring the matter more
closely by the judge's hostility to the questions
and insistence on asking the questions himself."
(see appellant's brief p. 9)

Judge Bullock

specifically asked Mr. Marsh if he had any further
questions

(Tr. 5). Counsel informed the court

of the questions he desired to ask and the court
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addressed those questions to the jury.

One question

asked was:
" . . . would any of you have
a predisposition to give more
credence to a law enforcement
officer's testimony, a sheriff's
testimony, say than anyone else
. . .?" (Tr. 7).
In response to this question, a prospective juror
answered that he was acquainted with Officer Ferre
and Officer Blackhurst.

The court questioned the

juror and cautioned him to be fair and weigh the
evidence.
panel

Mr. Marsh then specifically passed the

(Tr. 8).
As demonstrated by the recordr defense

counsel was not deterred by the court in questioning
the prospective jurors.

He was given every opportunity

to explore any possible biases, prejudices, influencial
relationships, etc. of the jurors.

The court's

conduct was beyond reproach.
The testimony of Officer Ferre and Officer
Bullock raised no factual issues.

Their testimony

was part of a long string of testimony establishing
an uncontested sequence of events. Neither testified
on any critical or determinative issues.

Their

testimony could not have resulted in any prejudice
to the appellant.

Appellant was not prejudiced in lav/ or in
fact

by any familiarity between any juror and any

witness and has no grounds for reversal on this point.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE
IMPANELED JURY AND TRY THE CASE TO THE
COURT.
Midway through the trial, appellant made a
motion to dismiss the jury and try the case to the
court alone.

His motion was denied.

It is undisputed that defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial in criminal cases.
There is no absolute constitutional nor statutory
right to try a case to the court alone.

The

Supreme Court in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24,
85 S.Ct.783 (1965) stated;
" . . . there is no federally
recognized right to a criminal
trial before a judge sitting alone,
but a defendant can, as was held in
Patton, in some instances waive his
right to a trial by jury."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2

(1953), as amended,

gives a defendant the right to waive trial by jury,
in certain cases as spoken in Singer.
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The court

pertaining to that right:
"The ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily
carry with it the right to insist upon
the opposite of the right. For
example, although a defendant can,
under some circumstances waive his
constitutional right to a public trial,
he has no absolute right to compel a
private trial. . . . "
The Court found that a jury trial is the preferable
mode of trial in a criminal case and that the state
as well as the defendant has an interest in the type
of trial had.

It therefore

upheld a federal rule

of procedure requiring consent of the court and the
government before any waiver.
by the Utah statute.

Consent is not required

Respondent does not seek to inject

that which the legislatiure omitted.
Defendant does have a choice.
a jury or he may choose instead
to the court alone.

He may request

to try his case

He has only one choice.

He

cannot exercise that choice and then be allowed to
change his mind,

whenever he perceives it to his

advantage to do so.
Appellant in this case chose a jury.
jury was impanelled and sworn.
and evidence presented.

The

Testimony was taken

Midway through the trial,
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appellant changed his mind and tried to waive the
jury he had previously demanded.

He believed that

his position had changed and his advantage shifted.
The trial court entertained his motion and heard
argument from both counsel.

The motion was denied.

The court stated:
" . . . the defendant does not have
a federal constitutional right to be
tried by the court - as he does to be
tried by a jury. That whether or not
a jury may be waived and a defendant
tried by the court is within the
sound discretion of the court and that
there was no abuse of discretion in
this case, particularly in view of the
fact that the first attempt at a jury
waiver and trial by the court came
after the State had presented its
evidence." (Tr. 97).
Appellant admittedly has a right to waive
a jury.

Respondent submits that appellant did not

timely do so, and therefore has no basis to claim any
error on the part of the court in denying his motion.
Dismissing the jury midway through the trial would
require a complete retrial with all of its attendant
expense and time consuming delay.

Appellant should

not be allowed to demand a jury and then seek reversal
because he got it.

Such shifty tactics take no re-

gard of order.
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There exists an original choice - the right to
a jury and the right to waive a jury.

The choice

must be exercised timely and cannot be renegotiated
Upon the whim of a defendant.
Appellant based his motion to waive on
his own opinion that the jury impaneled was not
an impartial one.

The Court, viewed this as an

improper ground for dismissing the jury.

The

proper motion was a motion for mistrial or motion
for a new trial. These motions were in fact filed
prior to appellant's waiver, but were both denied.
The Court believed the jury to be fair, impartial,
and unprejudiced by any familiarity with the witnesses.
An untimely waiver of the jury at that point was
an attempt to go in the back door.
Appellant has no constitutional nor statutory
right to demand a jury, and once he has itf dismiss
it.

He has a right to one or the other, not both.

It was within the sound discretion of the trial
court in this situation, to rule on the waiver*
It did not err in denying appellant's motion.
CONCLUSION
Appellant was tried by an impartial jury
and found guilty of second degree murder.
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The record

supports that verdict.

The trial court properly

exercised its discretion in ruling on several motions
made by appellant during trial and did not err in
denying those motions.
Appellant received a fair and impartial trial
and his conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

